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This paper provides new evidence on the eﬀects of bank capital requirements in In-
donesia. In investigating the impact of bank capital requirements, we set up a simple
model of the banking ﬁrm which can detect the impact of capital regulation on banks’
behaviour as well as having possible eﬀects on the economy. In estimation, we use
monthly panel data of all the banks that existed between 1997-1999, during which
the crisis and regulatory forbearance occurred. Based on our econometric tests, we
choose the Fixed Eﬀects panel regression model because the bank speciﬁc character-
istics are found to be crucial in Indonesia. Overall, the results suggest that regulatory
capital takes part in the change of Indonesian banks’ behaviour. Bank credit is found
to decelerate but with less than before the Indonesian government implemented a for-
bearance in capital requirements. The view that banks choose to shrink their balance
sheet activities during the capital shocks is consistent with the ﬁndings.
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11 Introduction
After the seminal contribution by Miller and Modigliani in 1958 that shows the indepen-
dency value of a ﬁrm to its capital structure in a frictionless world with full information
and complete markets, capital had been the issue both in corporate and banking sectors.
However, only in 1988 bank regulators of the G10 countries agreed to adopt the Basel Ac-
cord for their common capital requirements and recently it has been implemented in some
100 countries around the world. Such cross-border standardisation was designed to provide
a level playing ﬁeld for internationally active banks within the member countries and to
strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking system by encouraging
international banking organisations to meet a common solvency requirement.
In spite of many convincing arguments for Basel Accord, there are concerns in devel-
oped countries of possible negative impact in the early phase of its implementation. From
theoretical and empirical sights, capital requirements lead to a sudden contraction of bank
lending. In other words, the ﬁxed minimum requirement of capital changes the behaviour
of banks to shrink their balance sheets and in eﬀect, it creates a slowdown in the growth
of economy. The concerns have also been expressed for less developed countries where the
possible negative impact of capital requirements seems to be more relevant, given a larger
role of banking system in emerging countries. This topic is of special interest in Indonesia,
especially after many special events such as the full implementation of capital requirements
in 1992, Asian crisis in 1997 and 1998 capital forbearance.
The economic reform and ﬁnancial liberalisation caused lending boom in Indonesia
through banks as the most important ﬁnancial intermediaries. This is followed by roaring
in consumption and asset prices and in return, while corporate and ﬁnancial sectors en-
joyed a very high growth of economic development, macroeconomic vulnerability increases
due to riskier banks’ portfolios. The Indonesian rupiah depreciated drastically, generating
enormous defaults by ﬁrms and substantially banks which had borrowed unhedged foreign
currency denominated loans. Several banks were critically undercapitalised, even long be-
fore the crisis commenced. Shocks to the bank capital resulting from the unstable market
cuts the channel of bank credit since other alternative transmissions such as bond market
are not developed. Unsatisfactory enforcement of bank regulations in the past meant that
policies covering intra group lending, loan concentrations, and credit worthiness criteria
were consistently broken with impunity.
Basel Accord suggests minimum bank capital adequacy of 8 percent for healthy estab-
lished banks in well regulated and stable economies. Higher ratios are required for high
risk or potentially volatile economies. However, during the crisis in Indonesia, most banks
are technically insolvent and distinguishing among diﬀerent levels of capital adequacy be-
came a problem. Strict adherence to international capital standard was feared to deprive
the funds needed for restructuring corporate sector. In 1998, exactly in the middle of the
crisis, Bank Indonesia had therefore designed a program of regulatory relief or forbearance
to assist troubled banks. This program led to low capital requirements but applied more
strict rules which had demoralised the banking sector activities. While Bank Indonesia used
moral suasion to encourage banks to meet the criteria in the period before the crisis, the
forbearance supported regulators to penalise troubled banks into liquidation. Otherwise,
they are required to enter the recapitalisation program if unable to meet the requirements.
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sia. In investigating the impact of bank capital requirements, we set up a simple model
of the banking ﬁrm which can detect the impact of capital regulation on banks’ behaviour
as well as having possible eﬀects on the economy. In estimation, we use monthly panel
data of all the banks that existed between 1997-1999, during which the crisis and regula-
tory forbearance occurred. Based on our econometric tests, we choose the Fixed Eﬀects
panel regression model because the bank speciﬁc characteristics are found to be crucial in
Indonesia. Overall, the results suggest that regulatory capital takes part in the change of
Indonesian banks’ behaviour. Bank credit is found to decelerate but with less than be-
fore the Indonesian government implemented a forbearance in capital requirements. The
view that banks choose to shrink their balance sheet activities during the capital shocks is
consistent with the ﬁndings.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 surveys theories relat-
ing to the impact of capital requirements, and summaries the major alternative empirical
hypothesis developed from the theories. Part of the section also explains bank capital reg-
ulation in Indonesia. Section 3 outlines the methodology which is employed in the study.
Section 4 discusses the data and model speciﬁcation. Results are presented in section 5.
Finally, section 6 contains concluding remarks.
2 The Impact of Capital Requirements: Related Lit-
erature
The survey of evidence on the eﬀectiveness of 1988 Basel Accord within the G10 countries
has been carried out by the Bank of International Settlements as the host of the Accord
(BIS 1999). In essence, there are two signiﬁcant aspects that are commonly revealed
by the literature. The ﬁrst concentration of the study is to investigate whether banks
fulﬁl the capital requirements by increasing capital or by altering the risk-weighted assets.
Table 1 lists papers that look at this substitution eﬀect study where most of which have
concentrated on US banks. The literature begins with Shrieves and Dahl (1992) who use
several periods of cross-section data on commercial banks in the US. The risk exposure
and capital levels are simultaneously related in the their model1. They claim that the
eﬀectiveness of risk-based capital standard depends on how well the standard reﬂects the
true risk exposure of the banks. Subsequently, Jacques and Nigro (1997) utilise three-stage
least squares method of estimation for US banks in the period of 1990-1991 and ﬁnd that
capital regulation has a signiﬁcant impact on risk and vice versa. Aggarwal and Jacques
(1998) repeat the analysis of Shrieves and Dahl, employing a cross-sectional of US bank
data for 1991, 1992 and 1993. They speciﬁcally examine the impact on bank behaviour of
the 1991 FDICIA legislation and the Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) provisions which
obliged supervisors to take speciﬁc actions when banks’ capital ratios fell below certain
trigger levels. Accordingly, they discover that banks in the undercapitalised categories
1Shrieves and Dahl (1992) adopt 1981 Standards for risk-based capital. In December 1981, the Federal
Reserve and the Oﬃce of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) announced a common set of standards
to apply to all the banks which they regulate. The Standards set a minimum capital ratio of 7% for
community banks and 6.5% for regional banks.
3increase their capital target ratios more quickly than other banks with higher initial capital.
Calibrating the model with empirical data from the US banking industry in 1984-1993,
Calem and Rob (1996) assess quantitatively the impact of the risk-based capital standard.
Their model assumes that a bank operates in a multi-period setting and bank capital may
ﬂuctuate over time depending on the realised returns on loans. The main ﬁnding is that
higher capital requirements may lead to an increase of portfolio risk with greater eﬀect
on undercapitalised banks than well-capitalised ones. Slightly diﬀerent way of testing the
impact of capital regulation, Wall and Peterson (1995) assume that bank capital regulation
creates constraint on the dynamics of bank capital. They claim that empirical studies
abandon the nexus of bank model and regulatory model.
Recent studies, looking at the UK banks (Ediz, Michael, and Perraudin 1998) and the
Swiss banks (Rime 2001) provide some useful insight from outside the US. Ediz et al.
(1998) use conﬁdential supervisory data including detailed information about the balance
sheet and proﬁt and loss account of all British banks during the period of 1989-1995 and
apply the Random Eﬀects model of panel regression for their econometric approach. The
empirical insight from the paper oﬀers evidence that regulation is eﬀective as banks in the
UK attempt to meet the capital requirements by directly boosting the capital. Still in the
european context, Rime (2001) addresses the impact of capital requirements to Swiss banks
by exploiting Shrieves and Dahl’s methodology. His results indicate that Swiss banks are
induced to increase their capital, but it does not aﬀect the banks’ risk-taking.
Some authors have also contributed the theoretical case for higher capital standards
leading to a greater risk assumption and higher probability of failure. Among others, Koehn
and Santomero (1980) and Kim and Santomero (1988), using a mean-variance framework
to compare the bank’s portfolio choice with and without a solvency regulation, show that
capital requirements (both leverage and risk-based capital requirements) will introduce
changes in the composition of the risky part of the bank’s portfolio in such a way that
risk is increased and the probability of failure may be higher. This distortion, according
to Kim and Santomero, will disappear when regulators use correct measures of risk in the
computation of the solvency ratio. Rochet (1992) extends the work of Koehn and San-
tomero and discovers the following: (i) capital regulations are unable to prevent banks
from choosing a very specialised and very risky portfolios if the objective of commercial
banks is maximisation of the market value of their future proﬁts (value maximising banks),
and (ii) conversely, if banks behave as portfolio managers (utility maximising banks), reg-
ulations can be eﬀective, but only if the weights used in the computation of the ratio are
proportional to the systemic risks of the assets. A further theoretical ground argues that
a bank chooses portfolio with maximal risk and minimum diversiﬁcation. Consequently,
bank capital regulation is not suﬃcient for taking care of moral hazard (Blum 1999). Since
deposit insurance induces banks to hold less capital and choose higher risk capital, Marshall
and Prescott (2000) show that capital requirements directly reduce the default of proba-
bility and portfolio risk. They suggest that an optimal bank capital regulation is possible
by supplementing state-contingent penalties based on bank’s performance. Assuming the
asset side of a bank is ﬁxed, Vlaar (2000) ﬁnds that while ineﬃcient banks see capital
requirements as a burden, the proﬁtability of eﬃcient banks improve when the capital is
binding.
The second portion of the literature, and most relevant to this paper, is to test whether
4the enforcement of capital requirements can lead to a contraction in banks’ supply of loans
or best described as credit crunch. The term credit crunch has been addressed widely by
credit channel literature under the notion of the bank lending channel2. This particular
channel describes how monetary shocks to banks’ balance sheet might aﬀect the cost of
ﬁnance for certain borrowers over and above the standard impact on ﬁnance costs of higher
interest rates (Bernanke and Gertler 1995). When there is a monetary (or other related
regulation) tightening, banks may ﬁnd diﬃculties to acquire external funds such as deposits
to ﬁnance lending. More importantly, changes in interest rates no longer summarise changes
in the cost of funding for certain borrowers.
Banks may shrink both assets and liabilities due to capital regulation which would
impact the economy in terms of the slowdown of credit supply. With a binding capital
requirements, additional capital is needed to expand more lending. However, banks may
prefer to shrink rather than to issue new equities due to the asymmetric information and
lemons problems (Myers and Majluf 1984). A formal analysis by Blum and Hellwig (1995)
shows a relationship between bank equity and bank lending may amplify macroeconomic cy-
cles, tempting banks to lend less when times are bad and to lend more when times are good.
More rigorously, Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) have addressed the importance of capital
as determinants of investment, monitoring, interest rates and its macroeconomic implica-
tions for banks. From a simple model that captures equilibrium level of banks and ﬁrms
in the credit market, they show that the macroeconomic magnitude of market-determined
capital ratios as part of monitoring are procyclical which means higher during expansions
and lower during recessions. By presenting the strong relationship between bank’s asset
side and liabilities side, Diamond and Rajan (2000) conﬁrm that capital requirements have
obvious eﬀects in the short run which is credit crunch whereas delicate outcome in the long
run which creates banks to be more risky in their performance.
From Table 2, it is clearly shown that studies on this topic capture more countries than
previous attempts. This is because of global crisis in the late 1990s, during which many
countries experience serious credit squeeze. By focusing on US data, Bernanke and Lown
(1991) demonstrate that loan growth at individual banks during the recession of 1991-
1992 is positively linked to initial capital ratios. In their study, a simple cross-sectional
regression of loan growth on bank capital signiﬁcantly proved the capital crunch hypothesis.
Similarly, another empirical study concentrating merely on New England Banks to control
many diﬀerences in loan demand by Peek and Rosengren (1995b) ﬁnd the same evidence
of capital crunch within the same period but focusing more on bank deposits. The authors
deﬁne capital crunch as bank shrinkage resulting from binding capital requirements, while
the term credit crunch is used in a situation where loan supply has fallen faster than
loan demand, a possible but not a necessary outcome of capital crunch3. Banks with
formal actions shrink at a signiﬁcantly faster rate than those without (Peek and Rosengren
1995a). Formal regulatory actions are devised for troubled banks that cannot meet or
satisfy the international Basel Accord and the informal actions such as memorandum of
understanding (MOU)4. Using quarterly data on US commercial banks between September
2Another type of channel is called balance sheet channel which describes how the borrowers’ ﬁnancial
health can aﬀect ﬁnance supply.
3Richard Syron introduced for the ﬁrst time the term capital crunch as the credit crunch resulted from
a shortage in bank capital (Syron 1991).
4MOU is undertaken by US regulators to invite Board of Directors of troubled banks to improve their
51989 and December 1997, Furﬁne (2000) derives structural estimates of the impact of
changes in capital requirements on bank lending growth and capital ratios. He shows
formally and empirically that there is a robust correlation between the shocks to bank
capital and a fall in lending.
Several research has been developed for Japanese banks’ perspective and the results
are consistent with the US data, especially in the beginning phase of Basel Accord. Ito
and Sasaki (1998) provide evidence that individual Japanese banks with lower capital
ratios had a tendency to issue more tier 2 capital (i.e. subordinated debts) and to reduce
lending. This behaviour resulted from a sharp decline in the stock prices during summer
1990 when banks found less capital gains and thus more issuance on subordinated debts.
Likewise, Kim and Moreno (1994), summarising from the aggregate data, ﬁnd that the
regulatory environment forced banking system in Japan to pay more attention to their
capital positions, aﬀecting the slowdown in the growth of lending. Furthermore, Woo
(1999) performs cross-sectional regressions between bank capital and lending growth which
supported capital crunch hypothesis during the early years of 1990s. By diﬀerentiating
bank capital regulation into international and domestic standards, Honda (2002) ﬁnds that
capital standard has signiﬁcant eﬀects on bank credit in Japan. The international standard
reduced the credit slightly more than the domestic regulation5. In his estimation with Fixed
Eﬀects model, Honda includes unemployment rate to capture general business condition,
logarithm of assets to absorb diﬀerences in the loan structure and land prices to control
the real estate collapse after 1990 in Japan.
In the context of emerging countries, Chiuri, Ferri, and Majnoni (2001) argue that the
introduction of higher minimum bank capital requirements may well induce an aggregate
slowdown or contraction of bank credit. Their sample selection embraced 16 emerging
countries, ten of which experienced both regulatory change and ﬁnancial crises (Argentina,
Brazil, Hungary, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Paraguay, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela)
and other ﬁve non-crisis countries (Chile, Costa Rica, India, Poland, and Slovenia). The
analysis, however, does not include Indonesia in their sample selection. It was in 1992
that the full implementation of minimum capital requirements for Indonesian banks had
been introduced. Nevertheless, there are still limited studies focusing on the eﬀectiveness
of Capital Accord or the possibility of a slowdown in credit channel6. Extensive work has
been performed to ﬁnd an alternative path of risk modeling for capital adequacy assessment
(Santoso 1999). Furthermore, Abdullah and Santoso (2000) claim that the current Capital
Accord was unable to capture bank problems in Indonesia. They argue that risk-based
capital requirements, which rely solely on credit risk, fail to assess the banks.
Two empirical studies have been devoted to ﬁnd the evidence of credit crunch in In-
donesia. Firstly, using the disequilibrium framework to distinguish the supply and demand
for credit that has been the binding constraint, Ghosh and Ghosh (1999) ﬁnd that as the
banking system crisis deepened, the supply of real credit declined. Credit demand was
also discovered to fall sharply as economic recession appeared. The second is the paper by
ﬁnancial condition.
5International standard for capital regulation in Japan is 6 percent before 1991, 7.25 percent from 1991
to 1992 and 8 percent after 1992. Banks with domestic standard take values of 4 percent in his sample
period.
6For studies concentrating on Indonesian banking crisis and the lessons to be learnt, see Santoso (2000)
and Pangestu and Habir (2002).
6Agung, Kumiarso, Pramono, Hutapea, Prasmuko, and Prastowo (2001) which shows the
existence of credit crunch after the crisis. In formulating the model, Agung et al. extended
the Ghosh and Ghosh framework into macro (disequilibrium framework) and micro (panel
regression) eﬀects. The concentration of the study, however, is more on the cause of slow-
down in bank lending during 1994-2000 without taking into consideration the regulatory
forbearance in 1998 nor the severe lost in capital during and after the crisis. Their main
results are comparable to our analysis as they argue that the slowdown in lending growth
was caused by the supply factor which proves the credit crunch hypothesis.
2.1 Bank Capital Regulation in Indonesia
To understand the interest and implication of the study, this section brieﬂy explains bank
capital regulation in Indonesia. Banking supervisory in Indonesia was coordinated under
Master Dokumen Pengawasan Bank (MDPB) which includes the Master Plan (MP) and
the Detailed Action Plan (DAP). Under the MP, Bank Indonesia as a sole regulator for
the banking industry, conducts Special Surveillance (SS) and On-Site Supervisory Presence
(OSP) to several banks that are deemed to be important for the economy (i.e. four state-
owned banks and ﬁve national private banks). DAP consists of speciﬁcally important steps
to follow the Core Principles on Eﬀective Banking Supervision of the Bank of International
Settlements.
A series of bank reform packages as part of ﬁnancial liberalisation was introduced in the
period of 1988-1999. Financial liberalisation tends to increase the intensity of competition
among banks at the same time as banks are given greater freedom to allocate assets and
determine interest rates. To stabilise this competition among banks, capital requirements
which represent the main banking supervisory instrument in Indonesia was initiated as
part of PAKTO (October 1988 package). Even though many banks are unable to meet
the requirements, the Indonesian approach is fully consistent with the basic standards laid
down in the Basel Accord. The accord suggests that banks were required to reach at a
minimum of 8 percent Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) by the end of December 1992. Be-
cause of the recent ﬁnancial crisis, Bank Indonesia adopts a regulatory relief or forbearance
of CAR from 8 percent to 4 percent, notionally to provide a breathing space for the banks
and their borrowers7. To enforce the performance of prudential capital regulation, Inter-
national Monetary Fund has placed Technical Assistance which mainly helps the Special
Surveillance’s task.
Indonesian Banks would get administrative sanction or forced into the recapitalisation
program if fail to meet the regulatory requirements (Pangestu and Habir 2002)8. The
system adopted in such regulation is similar to the 1991 US Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA). While banks are not allowed to fail, it is vital
that corrective action be taken, especially if banks still have a manageable cushion of
capital. This is predominantly important since low or negative capital often entice bank
managers to seek frantic solutions such as raising very high rates on deposits to ﬁnance
7The CAR is restored again to 8 percent in 2001. Bank Indonesia Act of 2001 replaces Bank Indonesia
Act of 1992 and 1998.
8Before this program elevated, Bank Indonesia strived to persuade for higher solvency ratios by moral
suasion.
7high-risk borrowers or also known as gambling for resurrection (Dewatripont and Tirole
1994).
As in September 1998, the banking recapitalisation program was carried out by In-
donesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA), under the Ministry of Finance. The IBRA
together with OSP supervise troubled banks and dispose banks’ assets under its control9.
In classifying which banks to go for the recapitalisation program, IBRA proposed three
groups based on an audit by international accounting ﬁrms. Banks with CAR more than 4
percent were categorised A and could continue its operations. Between 4 percent and -25
percent of CAR, banks were categorised B and candidates of the program, provided that
the owners could inject 20 percent of new capital to accomplish CAR of 4 percent. The last
category, C, where banks had CAR less than -25 percent would be taken over or closed by
IBRA unless they could supply more funds to be allocated in the recapitalisation program.
In summary, although Indonesian banks faced a lower capital regulation, the situation post
crisis pushed the regulator to strengthen the rule by means if violated, a bank is allocated
to the recapitalisation program or even closed.
Almost all of the evidence shows that ﬁxed minimum capital requirements can aﬀect
the real economy through reductions in lending when banks are capital constrained. In
other words, empirical ﬁndings suggest that the capital value of the banking industry had
an eﬀect on lending. The studies mostly describe the developed countries experience which
have advantages in the availability of virtually every bank data, with the exception of Chiuri
et al. (2001). Notwithstanding, it is necessary to check the impact of capital requirement
systems operating in other countries.
Studies of credit crunch in Indonesia have signiﬁcantly supported the hypothesis, but
leaving aside the role of capital regulation. Therefore, a careful assessment proves to require
new empirical evidence. Experience from East Asian ﬁnancial crisis suggests that banks
chose to shrink both their assets and liabilities after the regulatory enforcement, aﬀecting
the economy defectively through credit crunch or capital crunch hypotheses (Chiuri et
al. 2001). In this paper, we take Indonesia as the main consideration in checking the
eﬀectiveness of regulatory capital on bank balance sheet. More importantly, Indonesia
experienced regulatory forbearance which is unique among other crisis emerging countries.
We use the methodology advocated by Peek and Rosengren (1995b) in testing the regulatory
capital and Indonesian bank behaviour.
3 Methodology
Testing the impact of ﬁxed minimum capital regulation on banks’ behaviour pose various
challenges in empirical investigation. The foremost challenge is the diﬃculty of determin-
ing supply or demand driven contractions in intermediation. This problem, noted among
others by Bernanke and Lown (1991), Peek and Rosengren (1995b) and Ghosh and Ghosh
(1999), must be treated within any attempt to empirically model the interlink between
bank balance sheet and sources of its shocks. Accordingly, we tackle this problem by em-
ploying a methodology proposed by Peek and Rosengren which can be simpliﬁed to model
9The separation of the duty is that Bank Indonesia assesses the condition of banks and those failing to
meet certain standards are to be reviewed by IBRA.
8the impact of changes in capital regulation on deposits and loans of the banks operating
in Indonesia. Speciﬁcally, this framework can simply identify two sources of capital short-
age. The ﬁrst source is whether from loan losses which forced banks to write oﬀ capital
or, secondly, from changes in regulation which raised banks’ capital ratio. In the case of
Indonesia, despite some of them eventually being closed or taken over, banks prefer to meet
the 4 percent capital requirements by which this study will look at. The framework ﬁts
Indonesian case as it explores the condition of bank balance sheet during the crisis with
regulatory change planted in the representation. Slightly diﬀerent to Peek and Rosengren’s
methodology, in our estimated equations (section 4), we include some variables that are
deemed necessary to stabilise the remaining diﬀerences in demand shocks across banks as
well as macroeconomic conditions.
To explore how the implications of the two sources of shocks reﬂect to Indonesian
banks performance, we use the Fixed Coeﬃcient Model (FCM) with some extension to
ﬁt the analysed case. FCM is commonly used as the standard description of one period
banking ﬁrm and industry which emphasises the asset-transformation function of ﬁnancial
intermediaries10. The bank’s eﬀort to maximise its proﬁt is captured implicitly.
Consider a simpliﬁed one-period balance sheet of a bank:
Assets Liabilities
Loans (L) Deposits (D)
Equity (K)
or mathematically can be expressed as:
A = L = D + K (1)
We assume that a bank in this model has only one type of assets which is loans (L), and
two types of liabilities which are bank capital (K) and total deposits (D).
The Basel Accord deﬁnes capital on a consolidated basis and applies risk-weighting
coeﬃcients to the assets. For simplicity, the model describes regulatory capital requirements





where KR denotes the capital requirements11. Speciﬁcally, a bank can only meet its capital
requirements by either issuing more capital (equity) or decreasing assets. Although it is not
necessary for our analysis, hitherto we can construct a risk-based capital adequacy ratio as
rKR = K
wL where rKR is risk based CAR and w is the risk-weighting coeﬃcients applied
to diﬀerent type of assets. Simply rearrange equation (2), the supply determined loans can





10For a discussion of the inﬂuential papers in banking regulation, see Freixas and Rochet (1997).
11Following Peek and Rosengren, we can also see that bank behaviour is constrained by the required
capital to assets ratio K ≥ KR × A = KR × L and furthermore KR × (D + K).
9To see the eﬀect of regulatory capital on liabilities, the deposit function needs to be
attained using (1) and (3):

























Bank creates deposits to ﬁnance loans, resulting assets and liabilities to increase equally
without any increase in capital. However, bank’s behaviour alters only if there is an adverse
movement to capital as what happened during the ﬁnancial crisis in Indonesia. From (1)
and (5), when a bank is not capital constrained by binding requirements (KR 6= K/L), a
negative shock in capital (dK < 0) forced banks to increase deposits (dD > 0) or otherwise
loans would fall. Similarly, as shown in (1) and (6), a reduction in capital compels banks to
shrink loans but they would need to relinquish proﬁtable loans. Accordingly, banks choose
to increase deposits to reinstate some of their lost equity.
Conversely, the bank responds in a diﬀerent way if capital is constrained by requirements
(KR ≤ K/L), aﬀecting both deposits and loans to decrease12. If there is an increase in
capital requirements (dKR > 0), a decline in capital determines a result of reduction in
deposits and thus loans must decline to adjust the fallings (equation 5). In other words,
if the capital ratio is binding, the decrease in bank capital (dK < 0) forces a proportional
decrease in deposits (dD < 0). At the same time, it is easy to see from (6) that a negative
shock of capital would shrink loans (dL < 0) or the dilemma of credit crunch. Note that
an increase in the capital ratio would decrease loans and deposits when a bank is capital
constrained. Under this condition, it is natural that banks reduce its supply of credit, as
increasing the supply would add risky assets in balance sheet and more capital is required.
Generally, in terms of loans, an increase in KR and a decrease in K would have a negative
impact for capital constrained banks. From the liabilities side, these two correlations aﬀect
deposits in a similar way.
The regulatory forbearance in Indonesia implies a decrease of capital requirements from
8 percent to 4 percent. Thus, if the bank is capital constrained, the combination of crisis
as in shocks to capital and regulatory softening as in a decrease in capital requirements
(dKR < 0) would result a decrease in loans, depending on a decline in capital. This is
somewhat expected by regulators in Indonesia, to give more channel of funds for restruc-
turing eﬀort. Similar to loans (equation (4)), banks would shrink deposits but less than
the situation when there is an increase in capital requirements.
Some caveats need to be addressed in this model. First, as a matter of simplicity, we do
not include any interest rate speciﬁcations for deposits and loans in the model. However,
in the estimated equations (section 4), we provide the benchmark of Indonesian interest
12While banks are expected to meet or be above the regulatory requirements, some of them are still
found to be below the minimum capital requirements because of the endogenous problem.
10rate as one of the control variables. Second, this model is a one-period model in which all
variables are assumed to be positive. Third, we assume that the deposits which serve as
the marginal source of funds to banks are non-transaction accounts that have no reserve
requirements (Peek and Rosengren 1995b). Finally, we disregard the asset and liability
management by banks in a model.
The model aims at searching the capital crunch as a result of binding capital require-
ments. An outsized adverse shock to capital is a necessary but not a suﬃcient condition
for capital crunch (Peek and Rosengren 1995b). The bank will shrink by less with capital
remains well above the regulatory requirement or when the enforcement of capital require-
ments is not evident. Since its adoption in 1992, Capital Accord in Indonesia has hardly
caused a drop in loans or deposits. This is due to a considerable increase in both lend-
ing capacity and bank credit in 1994-1996 (Agung et al. 2001). However, the regulatory
forbearance of 4 percent in 1998 and large capital losses during the crisis reﬂected the
situations of capital crunch described in the model.
4 Data and Model Speciﬁcation
4.1 The Data
The bank data were obtained from the Department of Economic Research and Monetary
Policy, Bank Indonesia13. In addition, the GDP and Indonesian SBI data were acquired
from the Datastream. The samples are unbalanced panel data extracted from 140 banks
during 1997-199914. As this study concentrates on the eﬀects of capital standard and its
forbearance in 1998, January 1997 was selected as the beginning date to see the behaviour
of banks before the reduction of regulatory capital. Indeed, 1997 was also the time that
many banks were detected to have problems in Indonesia (Santoso 2000). The sample
selection ends in December 1999 to avoid distortions from seasonal factors. Another reason
to end the sample in this year is that the eﬀect of regulation forbearance is not expected
in the same year, rather it may spread in the following year. Consequently, the panel sums
up to 5040 observations.
The sample of banks scrutinised in this task includes all commercial banks (state- and
private-owned) supervised by Bank Indonesia. The liquidated banks before the end of 1999
were eliminated from the sample because the inclusion would have biased the results toward
summarising the connections between capital and bank behaviour. As the model deﬁnes,
liabilities side of each bank only contains total equity and deposits (in local and foreign
currencies). Furthermore, the deﬁnition of assets as suggested by the Bank of International
Settlements may complicate testing the capital crunch hypothesis. We then focus on total
assets rather than test all diﬀerent deﬁnitions of assets. This approach works eﬀectively as
the total equity to total assets is the proxy of risk-weighted CAR. Besides, the method is
consistent with most studies which test the credit crunch or capital crunch hypotheses 15.
13The data is similar to the one used by Agung et al. (2001) and does not specify the name of individual
bank.
14The data is unbalanced as there are some missing observations across times.
15See Table 2 for the list.
114.1.1 Preliminary Evidence
Table 3 presents the summary of Indonesian bank balance sheet statistics in the sample
study. The trend of most variables in the table shows a large decline. In addition, from
the standard deviation values, the dynamics of each variable show profound variability
across banks. The striking ﬁnding is the standard deviation of change in capital which is
842.90 percent in 1997. This result shows that only a few of Indonesian banks with poor
capitalisation were suﬀering from the ﬁnancial crisis that happened in the middle of 1997.
In contrast, the maximum of change in capital was very large, showing that some banks
might have enjoyed the crisis. The probable explanation is that banks with good foreign
exchange trading desks could obtain a massive proﬁt during the turmoil16. From the mean
value of change in capital in 1999, it is clear that the worth of bank capital has decreased
signiﬁcantly after the regulatory forbearance with poorly capitalised banks suﬀering the
most.
The growth of deposits provides very valuable aspects for our analysis. During the
early phase of the ﬁnancial crisis, deposits grew rapidly as Indonesian banks increased
their deposit rates. However, when Bank Indonesia implemented regulation forbearance,
deposits fell drastically from 9.15 percent of mean growth in 1997 to only 2.10 percent
in 1998 and -10.28 percent in 1999. The large spread of maximum and minimum rates
of deposit growth in the whole sample may be associated with the ﬂight of quality by
depositors. Indeed, as the crisis spread out in December 1997, the depositors’ ﬂight to
quality was allegedly the most extreme case17. In general, after the restriction of regulation
in 1998 (although Bank Indonesia reduced the capital to assets ratio), the deposit growth of
banks fell dramatically, showing the evidence of bank shrinking. This preliminary evidence
supports our theoretical analysis in section 3.
Moreover, the mean growth of assets dropped slightly in the whole sample study and hit
a low of 0.73 percent in the year after regulatory forbearance. The probable explanation for
a plunge in assets is due to the behaviour of banks when forced to meet the capital require-
ments but having diﬃculties to raise more equity in the crashed market. As a consequent,
banks choose to reduce their assets as predicted by the capital crunch hypothesis. This
evidence is further supported by a large decrease in loans. When the crisis unfolded, the
mean of growth plummeted signiﬁcantly from 3.84 percent in 1997 to -2.12 percent in 1998.
Bank lending as an important transmission mechanism in Indonesia was distracted heavily
during this year, explaining the situation of credit crunch. Therefore, our data proves the
credit crunch hypothesis which is consistent with the ﬁnding by Agung et al. (2001). As
expected by the regulators, the mean growth of loans increased by 11.57 percent after the
year of regulatory forbearance. The lower capital regulation was hoped to rise the credit
channel by banks to fund the economic reformation eﬀort.
In the sample period, the capital to assets ratio was well above the regulation, both
before and after the regulatory forbearance. However, the minimum and maximum values
16Normally, foreign banks in Indonesia have a very sophisticated dealing room as well as better skills
than the local competitors. Due to the nature of the data, we cannot distinguish the foreign and local
banks.
17Flight to quality supposedly consisted of deposits shifting from small to large banks, as the latter were
perceived too big to fail controversy or simply more likely to receive public sector support in the case of
diﬃculties.
12of capital to asset ratio show that some banks were still undercapitalised throughout the
sample period18. As discussed above, banks attempted to meet the regulatory capital by
lowering its assets, rather than boosting the capital. This suggests the shrinkage of overall
banks’ balance sheets. Therefore, the preliminary evidence proposes a situation of capital
crunch.
4.2 Model Speciﬁcation
In order to test for the eﬀect of deposits and loan of a change to capital requirements,
we utilise the Peek and Rosengren (1995b) approach with some adjustment composed to
speciﬁcally convene the Indonesian case. Instead of using data for cross section banks, this
study looks at a panel data speciﬁcation for individual banks. Several beneﬁts of panel
data are shown by Baltagi (1995). Firstly, our panel data controls for bank individual
heterogeneity within certain dynamic duration which cannot be found in time series or
cross section studies. Secondly, as panel data is usually assembled on micro units, such as
banks in our case, most variables can then be more accurately measured at the micro bank
level and biases resulting from aggregation over banks are eliminated19. We try to minimise
the limitations that may come up in panel data by carefully designing and collecting the
sample data.
Moreover, the test takes account of control variables for macroeconomic eﬀects during
time period of the study. Peek and Rosengren do not include any macroeconomic variables
as the sample collected only covers New England banks which they claim to be the region
where many of the formal regulatory actions have been issued under the capital guidelines.
Following Peek and Rosengren, the capital crunch hypothesis envisages that poorly capi-
talised banks will shrink deposits more rapidly than better-capitalised banks, holding the
loan demand eﬀects constant. As we can see in previous section, the change in deposits
and in loans are a function of total capital and change in capital ratio. The following two



































These two equations are the reduced forms of the systems exposed in section 3. The
subscript i refers to the bank and t refers to the time period. The dependent variable of
(7) is the change in deposits (∆D) and of (8) is the change in loans (∆L). Both variables
and change in capital (∆K) are normalised by the beginning of the year of total assets
to reduce the potential heteroscedasticity problems with the error term. The idiosyncratic
shocks of each bank is controlled by including the individual bank dummy variables (µb).
In other words, we estimate the two equations above by the Fixed Eﬀects Model.
18Note that the capital regulation is 8 percent in 1997 and 4 percent in 1999.
19Other advantages such as the ability to construct and test more complicated behavioural models than
pure cross sections or pure time series data are implicitly found in our estimation.
13Banks are not expected to fall below the minimum capital requirements, rather it is
anticipated to adjust capital or assets to satisfy the regulator. Banks with capital to
assets ratio below the required minimum would sense pressure to shrink independent to
the current capital shock. Thus, banks with poor capitalisation is expected to have a
sluggish growth in deposits or liabilities than better capitalised institutions. To capture
this phenomena, the tests include the beginning of the year capital to assets ratio, with
a1 and b1 are predicted to be positive20. The a2 parameter deﬁnes the eﬀect of changes in
bank deposits to changes in bank capital and predicted to be positive, exposing the capital
crunch hypothesis. Similarly, the relationship between a change in total capital on ∆L is
captured by the estimation of b2 and predicted to be positive.
During the crisis, Indonesian banks suﬀer macro negative shocks to their capital. Al-
though there was a decrease in capital standard, the enforcement was still evident and
substantially followed by a reduction in the supply of credit (shrinkage in the bank func-
tion). Banks with poor capitalisation that have negative shocks to capital will shrink their
liabilities more than banks with better capitalisation experiencing the same shocks. In
other words, the eﬀect of changes in capital are smaller for banks with higher initial capital
regulatory ratio. As a result, parameters a3 and b3 are predicted to be negative.
The study has also included several variables to take into account diﬀerences in the
loan demand structure. Note that these variables are not included in the model (section
3). At the outset, Indonesian banks face various types of loans which inﬂuence diﬀerent
demand shocks in the industry. The demand for loans may vary depending upon the
size of the borrower which resulted diﬀerent size of deposit growth rates conditional on
the size of banks. To control this predicament, the inclusion of logarithm of total assets
(log(A)) to control bank size would be beneﬁcial. Other factors that may be important in
controlling demand shocks are the growth of GDP (y) and the Indonesian monetary policy
variable which is the Certiﬁcates of Bank Indonesia (SBI). SBI was introduced to absorb
excess liquidity of banks and works as a tool for Bank Indonesia to manage reserves in
the banking industry through open market operations. Thus, a5 and b5 are predicted to
be positive whereas SBI is predicted to move negatively (positively) with changes in loans
(deposits).
5 Empirical Results
Following Baltagi (1995), we test the null hypothesis H0 : µb = 0 for b = 1,2,...,139,
by performing F-test to conﬁrm the superiority of Fixed Eﬀects model21. In general, the
F-tests indicate that H0 is rejected at the signiﬁcant level of 1 percent for changes in
deposits and loans, apart from loans in the estimation of the full sample period. Despite
this exception, the overall results support the Fixed Eﬀects model estimates against the
plain OLS estimates22.
20The inclusion of lagged capital to asset ratios is also to mitigate the endogeneity problem (Peek and
Rosengren 1995a, Peek and Rosengren 1995b, Chiuri, Ferri, and Majnoni 2001).
21Under the null hypothesis, OLS is consistent as there are no individual bank eﬀects in the model,
whereas under the alternative, Fixed Eﬀects model is eﬃcient.
22Nonetheless, the results of all panel regression models are reported in the two tables below.
14As the sample data almost covers the entire Indonesian banks and the parametric shifts
of regression explain the diﬀerences between banks, the use of Random Eﬀects model is
undesirable. For reassurance, the Hausman test is available for the test of the null hypoth-
esis of the Random Eﬀects model. If the null hypothesis is true, the Random Eﬀects model
estimates are reliable and asymptotically eﬃcient. If the alternative hypothesis is true,
however, the Random Eﬀects model estimates are unreliable. Under the null hypothesis,
the test statistics have the asymptotic chi-square distribution with 6 degrees of freedom
(χ2
6). Under the alternative, the test statistics tend to be large. For the changes in deposits
regressions, the Hausman test statistics are 141.86 and 126.63 for the models with full sam-
ple period and the year of regulatory forbearance, respectively. The critical value from χ2
6 is
12.59, which is far smaller than the test values. Similarly, changes in loans regressions have
values of 77.921 and 62.606 for the Hausman tests which are far higher than the critical
value. Therefore, the hypothesis that the individual eﬀects are uncorrelated with the other
regressors in our model can be rejected.
Overall, based on F-test, which is vital that there are individual eﬀects, and the Haus-
man test, which puts forward that these eﬀects are uncorrelated with other variables in
model, we conclude that the Fixed Eﬀects model is the better choice23. Although we are in
favour of Fixed Eﬀects model, the results of estimating equations (7) and (8) with all panel
data models are reported in Table 4 and 5, respectively. The idea is to compare results
with and without bank speciﬁc characteristics in the Indonesian data. To check further the
availability of capital crunch hypothesis in Indonesian banks, these two tables also report
the panel regression estimates only for the year of regulatory forbearance. We shall discuss
the empirical results into two separate sections.
5.1 The Eﬀects of Capital Regulation on Bank Deposits
The Fixed Eﬀects model estimates are reported in columns two and ﬁve of Table 4. The
coeﬃcient of the initial bank capital requirement is strong and signiﬁcant at the 5 percent
conﬁdence level. This result implies that the capital accord clearly had a signiﬁcant positive
relationship on bank deposits during the full sample period. However, throughout the
year of regulatory forbearance, capital/asset ratio is not signiﬁcant, seemingly due to this
variable barely controls the demand for deposits in 1998. This is even true throughout
the post crisis in Indonesia as banking system liabilities in real terms are reduced in size
by withdrawals of bank deposits. In addition, this fact is supported by the curiosity of
signiﬁcant negative ﬁnding in SBI as the benchmark for deposit rates in Indonesia24. The
coeﬃcients on the change in capital are positive, as expected by the theoretical analysis
in section 3, and statistically signiﬁcant at 1 percent in both regressions. During the
regulatory forbearance, the coeﬃcients doubled, explaining a stronger positive relationship
between changes in capital and changes in deposits which supported our hypothesis.
Parameter a3 in the regressions is signiﬁcantly negative as predicted by the capital
23According to Greene (2000), one can perform a Lagrange Multiplier test for the Random Eﬀects model
based on OLS residuals. However, given the two tests above, we can strongly conclude the signiﬁcance of
Fixed Eﬀects model.
24The diﬀerent result suggested by preliminary evidence may be due to a very large drop of change in
deposits after 1998.
15crunch hypothesis, the coeﬃcient on the change in capital is smaller for well-capitalised
banks than for poor-capitalised banks. The result is more signiﬁcant during the year
when CAR decreased to 4 percent. As discussed earlier, Indonesian regulation forbearance
demonstrated a decrease in capital requirements but it was accompanied by the enforcement
of capital regulation which had aﬀected the banks’ performance. Logarithm of total assets
and growth in GDP which are proposed to control for diﬀerences in demand have signiﬁcant
estimated coeﬃcients at 1 percent level in both the change in deposits regressions. Deposits
grow at a higher pace for larger banks because depositors move their deposits to larger
banks, as reﬂected in the positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients of logA. This result is due to
the Too Big To Fail hypothesis of Chiuri et al. (2001) which states the lower risk of closure
for larger institutions. A very high results of GDP growth in both regressions suggest that
condition in the economy strongly determines the behaviour of banks in Indonesia.
Finally, something must be said about other panel regression models in order to compare
them with the Fixed Eﬀects model estimates. All the demand factors in our estimates of
change in deposits are highly signiﬁcant and the values range closely to one another. For
logarithm of assets estimates in Fixed Eﬀects model, however, the values tend to be bigger.
Since Fixed Eﬀects model enables the basic model (OLS) to be rerun along with dummy
variables for individual banks25, this result means that some banks with bigger assets in
their portfolio enjoy more development during the good times but suﬀer more when the
crisis comes as it was shown rigourously by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). The coeﬃcients
of change in capital also show similar results for all panel regression models. The estimates
of parameter a3 in all regressions provide useful insight in testing the regulatory impact.
Given that the size of banks are controlled by log(A), lower but stricter capital regulation
had a stronger impact on undercapitalised banks. The higher values on the year of capital
forbearance seem to explain that Indonesian banks suﬀer even more after the start of the
Banking Reform.
To sum up the results of equation (7), capital crunch hypothesis is identiﬁed among
Indonesian banks. An attempt to raise capital ratios by banks with poor capitalisation had
caused them to grow more slowly and shrink more rapidly. In addition, the notion of credit
crunch was merely attributable to a decrease in loan demand is proven to be inconsistent
as bank shrinkage may also come from the deposits side of bank balance sheet.
5.2 The Eﬀects of Capital Regulation on Bank Loans
Columns two and ﬁve of Table 5 show that all of the coeﬃcients are as expected but only
variables to control the demand factors are highly signiﬁcant. GDP as the fundamental
economic factor has a positive relationship with changes in loans, consistent with the result
of Agung et al. (2001). However, comparing the results to the change in deposits (previous
subsection in this section), GDP growth has less eﬀect to the change in loans. The possible
explanation is the awareness of banks to be more caution in giving new loans during and
after the crisis even though the economic condition is recovering. Consistent with US banks
(Peek and Rosengren 1995b), Japanese banks (Honda 2002) and other emerging countries
(Chiuri et al. 2001), the measure of logarithm of total assets in Indonesia is positive and
25Fixed Eﬀects model is regularly identiﬁed as the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) model (Greene
2000).
16statistically signiﬁcant, indicating that the decline of loan demand is more pronounced for
larger banks.
The small and insigniﬁcant results the capital regulation variable (parameter b1) are
the evidence of its weakness, at least for a change in loans. Another way to explain the
insigniﬁcant of the capital ratio eﬀect is to evoke that capital ratios are an endogenous
variable chosen by banks. This eﬀect is contradictory to Japanese banks (Honda 2002)
and other emerging countries (Chiuri et al. 2001). As predicted by the theory, a change in
capital corresponds positively to a change in loans but never signiﬁcant in both regressions.
Much higher coeﬃcient of a change in capital during the year of regulatory forbearance is
likely to be more relevant for Indonesian banks which were aﬀected more sternly by the
combination of severe shocks in capital market and the burden of capital ratio.
A negative relationship is found between parameter b3 and a change in loans, but never
signiﬁcant in each of the regressions. This is probably due to all of the Indonesian banks
(not only the small capitalisation banks) reduce their lending in the aftermath of crisis.
Similar to the results of a change in deposits, coeﬃcients of SBI are highly signiﬁcant
in all panel regression models. Using the Random Eﬀects model, we discover a negative
coeﬃcient of capital to asset ratio for the entire sample period but, the same as other
models, insigniﬁcant. The Random Eﬀects model enables the basic model (OLS) to be
rerun along with a diﬀerent additive variance term for each bank, through a two-step
feasible generalised least squares. These outcomes mean that capital ratio never gives any
eﬀect to the bank lending behaviour, consistent with Peek and Rosengren (1995b) but
contrast with Honda (2002) who has found signiﬁcant credit crunch hypothesis in Japan
between 1987-1995. However, as suggested by the results of K/A × ∆K/A coeﬃcients in
all models, banks with lower initial CAR decrease lending more rapidly when there is a
shock to their capital.
In short, capital ratio, at least after the forbearance and as hoped by the regulators,
took less part in determining the slowdown of credit among Indonesian banks26. This result
is comparable to the study by Agung et al. (2001) which has argued the existence of credit
crunch between 1994-00. In this paper, we bear in mind the 1998 forbearance which has
been neglected by earlier studies. Our ﬁnding is that, as argued in the previous section
and the insigniﬁcant results of the change in loans regressions, bank shrinkage comes more
rapidly from the liabilities side of the banks.
The preliminary evidence (section 4) supports the hypothesis of credit crunch in the
entire sample period. One way to explain the diﬀerence to the econometric result is due to
banks with better capitalisation still enjoyed an increase in capital in the year of crisis but
experienced a drastic decrease in the Indonesian post-crisis situation. Thus the change in
loans which have decreased signiﬁcantly during the crisis (see Table 3, in particular columns
for Median and Maximum) were exposed to become more mild after the crisis27.
26One may say that regulatory forbearance has worked to soften the credit crunch problems.
27As explained before, we capture this phenomena by employing Peek and Rosengren framework.
176 Concluding Remarks
This paper has documented the empirical evidence that the bank capital requirements had
eﬀects on banks’ balance sheet in Indonesia. We have examined the Indonesian banks and
their behaviour during the period of 1997-1999 by estimating a modiﬁed version of Peek
and Rosengren (1995b)’s model. There are several signiﬁcant points that emerged from the
analysis.
Firstly, the main ﬁnding from the liabilities side of banks is that there was a strong
positive relationship between bank capital and growth rate of deposits. Although there
was a reduction in regulatory capital, the pressure was felt by Indonesian banks, especially
for poor-capitalised banks. Secondly, with regards to bank lending, it was shown that
credit crunch was less apparent in the aftermath of regulatory forbearance in Indonesia.
To avoid credit crunch dilemma in the future, Indonesian government and the central
bank have to develop alternative markets for credit channel while keeping strict capital
regulation. Indonesian capital markets are not properly regulated yet and similarly, the
recent development in ﬁnancial market suggests that domestic bond as another alternative
for capital raising is somewhat less attractive28. The government had issued several types
of bonds to fund the recapitalisation program but they seemed to be unattractive in the
market because the regulation for this market is unable to comfort investor’s conﬁdence.
Therefore, deregulation is desirable, not only in the stock market but also in other markets
such as commercial paper and bond markets.
Summing up the results from the eﬀects on deposits and loans, there is a concern of poor-
capitalised banks, most of which operate with low net worth relative to assets. Since their
presence diminishes the economies of scale of the whole banking system (as these banks use
up the implicit safety net), the government has set up an agency to deal with these troubled
banks. Nevertheless, bank restructuring is a necessary but not a suﬃcient condition for
economic recovery in Indonesia. To restore the conﬁdence of depositors, a proper and
explicit risk-based deposit insurance should be erected. Prudential regulation should be
improved as well as its ﬂexibility with new challenges. More importantly, supervisory
agencies should focus on the monitoring of bank compliance to enforce sound banking
practices29.
Finally, this paper contributes to the lengthy discussion on the Capital Accord, espe-
cially to the economies that rely heavily on bank credit. The process of enforcement of a
stricter bank capital discipline in developing countries calls particular attention. We have
been convinced by the empirical results that Basel Accord changed adversely the behaviour
of Indonesian banks. Since the Accord is internationally adopted, the amount of aggregate
credit or money supply are determined by capital. If this happened to each country that
sticks to the Accord, the global credit crunch could occur. This is not to say that Capital
Accord is objectionable. Our results should, however, be treated as an input for the revision
of new Capital Accord that currently remains in progress.
Notwithstanding, the study suggests a direction for further research. While we cover
28Agung (2000) ﬁnds that Indonesian ﬁrms faced ﬁnancial constraints and agency costs (debt ﬁnance)
in raising funds.
29Bank Indonesia decided to separate its regulation division by the end of 2002 into an independent
ﬁnancial services authority.
18capital regulation and its impact to Indonesian banks, the result is limited to our sample
period. A study covering an extended time period would be most useful, especially if the
risk based and/or the new capital adequacy (Basel Accord II) are employed. Using the
post-crisis data of Indonesian banks and testing it with the Basel II approach would allow
us to see the probable impact of this new capital regulation which is expected to come into
practice in 2004 (BIS 2001). In addition, Indonesia is expecting to have a deposit insurance
program in 2004 thereby replacing the existing blanket guarantee (Abdullah and Santoso
2000). Research in this area is subsequently needed as capital regulation would react
diﬀerently with the existence of other regulation instruments, especially deposit insurance.
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21Author Country and Period Capital Approach Capital Vs Risk-taking
Shrieves and Dahl (1992) US 1984-86 1981 Standards Positive Relationship
Wall and Peterson (1995) US 1989-92 Basel Accord Constrained Capital
Calem and Rob (1996) US 1984-93 Basel Accord Positive Relationship
Jacques and Nigro (1997) US 1990-91 Basel Accord Positive Relationship
Aggarwal and Jacques (1998) US 1991-93 Basel Accord Positive Relationship
Ediz et al. (1998) UK 1989-95 Basel Accord Positive Relationship
Rime (2001) Switzerland 1989-95 Basel Accord No Eﬀect to Risk
Table 1: Substitution Eﬀect of Capital Regulation
Author Country and Period Capital Approach Macroeconomic Impact
Bernanke and Lown (1991) US 1991-92 Capital Asset Ratio Slowdown in Lending
Peek and Rosengren (1995a) New England 1989-92 Capital Asset Ratio Shrinkage in Loans
Peek and Rosengren (1995b) New England 1990-91 Capital Asset Ratio Shrinkage in Deposits
Woo (1999) Japan 1990-91 Capital Asset Ratio Capital Crunch Evidence
Ito and Sasaki (1998) Japan 1990-93 Basel Accord Lending Tightening
Honda (2002) Japan 1986-95 Capital Standards Bank Creidt Reduction
Furﬁne (2000) US 1989-97 Basel Accord Loan Growth Reduction
Chiuri et al. (2001) Emerging 1993-99 Capital Asset Ratio Bank Credit Contraction
Table 2: Macroeconomic Impact of Capital Regulation
Table 3: Bank Balance Sheet Summary Statistics 1997-1999
Summary statistics are given for 140 sample banks over the period 1997-1998. The statistics are calculated
from monthly data. One month of each year is lost due to diﬀerencing. Contrary to Peek and Rosengren,
this table does not classify the size of banks and thus some values are found to be very large. By providing
mean, median, maximum, minimum and standard deviation of each variable in the table, the values can
then be analysed for diﬀerent bank capitalisation.
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev.
1997:1-1997:12
Change in Assets (%) 4.24 2.31 1147.01 -92.43 31.32
Change in Loans (%) 3.84 1.85 1285.20 -58.02 33.93
Change in Deposits (%) 9.15 1.62 7900 -54.97 203.13
Change in Capital (%) 31.97 1.35 33025.09 -95.86 842.90
Capital / Asset 0.122 0.097 1.695 0.003 0.125
1998:1-1998:12
Change in Assets (%) 1.64 0.28 186.13 -85.77 18.26
Change in Loans (%) -2.12 -2.58 142.24 -69.71 12.65
Change in Deposits (%) 2.10 0.42 214.38 -68.03 19.31
Change in Capital (%) 52.81 0.47 30227.37 -97.44 860.12
Capital / Asset 0.095 0.069 3.046 0.000 0.111
1999:1-1999:12
Change in Assets (%) 0.73 0.80 100.33 -71.13 12.57
Change in Loans (%) -0.68 -1.02 773.14 -92.10 29.84
Change in Deposits (%) 0.79 0.66 169.35 -70.81 14.22
Change in Capital (%) -10.28 0.90 35764.44 -56330.19 1710.36
Capital / Asset 0.083 0.075 2.609 -3.605 0.229
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